In characterizing this as a moral requirement, theorists distinguish political obligation from legal obligation. All legal systems claim to bind people subject to them; part of what we mean by a valid law is that the relevant population is required to obey it. This requirement is generally supported by coercion, while those who do not obey are subject to sanctions. Unless citizens have moral requirements to obey the law, they may be forced to do so, but in compelling obedience, the state is acting unjustly and impinging on their freedom.
It is hard to find philosophers who still think that normative questions can be resolved by linguistic considerations, but there are, surprisingly, some who do think that this argument strategy is essentially correct.
His obstetrical theory is parthenogenetic: Having a virgin birth, obligation has no father among familiar moral principles such as consent, utility, fairness, and so on. People in organic associations do often feel obligations to other members, but we normally seek an independent ground to justify them see Simmons ; Wellman One version focuses on the value Obligation to obey the law obligations attached to social roles.
It is important to see that there is not one problem here, but two. There is a matter of content: And there is the matter of validity: But these are intimately linked: There is no general answer to the question why role duties bind—it depends on the roles and the duties.
Even so, why do they ground a duty of obedience as opposed to a duty of respectful attention, or a duty to apologize for cases of non-compliance? Indeed, the classical associative model for political authority was not fraternity, but paternity, against which Locke argued so decisively.
This is not to deny that we owe something to those decent associations of which we find ourselves non-voluntary members—but we do need some further argument to determine exactly what this amounts to.
The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him other than the alleged authoritative directives if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to follow them, than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.
Raz; cf. Three points need emphasis. First, a normal justification is not a unique justification, but one typical to a variety of practical and theoretical authorities. At its core idea is that justified authorities help their subjects do what they already have good reason to do; it does not apply when it is more important for the subjects to decide for themselves than to decide correctly.
Second, although NJT has similarities to rule-utilitarianism, it is not a utilitarian theory: Third, NJT does not require valid authority to promote the subject's self-interest. For example, if there are investments it is immoral to make e.
NJT is governed by whatever reasons correctly apply to the case, not reasons of which the agent is aware, or which serve his self-interest narrowly understood.
Something like this does capture the way we justify deferring to expert opinions of scientists or to the advice of doctors who know better than we do. Were we to try to second-guess them we could not profit from their expertise. To accept them as authoritative therefore requires deferring to their judgement, and allowing that to displace our own assessment of what is to be done.
This is not blind deference: And the deference may be limited in scope and subject to checks of its effectiveness over time. How far do such considerations apply to political authority? They do to some extent. A legislator or administrator may know better than most what is to be done to preserve the salmon fisheries or to slow global warming.
But some scientists may know as well, or better, and in some areas there are be no criteria of relevant expertise at all. The only prospect of broadening NJT's reach therefore rests on its application to integrate the activity of many people who must cooperate but who disagree on these matters and more.
If authority is able to create or support valuable schemes of social cooperation, subjects may be justified in obeying even though that is not the scheme they would themselves have chosen.The obligation to obey the law – the normative phenomenon in jurisprudence.
Introduction: This dissertation aims to provide a general discourse into the normative jurisprudential phenomenon of .
The moral obligation to obey the law, or as it is generally called, political obligation, is a moral requirement to obey the laws of one’s country. Traditionally, this has been viewed as a require-ment of a certain kind, to obey the law for the “content-independent” reason that it is the law, as.
The question whether there is an obligation of obedience to law is a matter of whether we should act from the legal point of view and obey the law as it claims to be obeyed (Raz , –49).
1 Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study of the Death of Socrates, by Anthony D'Amato*, 49 Southern California Law Review () Abstract: Do we have an obligation to obey any law, no matter how unjust or evil, provided only that it is in fact a valid rule of the legal system in which we happen to be physically located?
false one, and no over-arching and concrete obligation to obey the law underlies it. It is worth stating to begin with what is meant by 'having an obligation' to obey the law, as the term can lead to some confusion.
The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition Joseph Raz ing an obligation to obey its laws is a denial of the justice of the state. This is believed to be so either on instrumentalist But if the obligation to obey the law is not a morally cor-rect reason by which the morally conscientious person should.